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Abstract—This paper discusses some challenges that dynamic
security assessment and control will face due to the integration of
multi-terminal high-voltage direct-current grids and the resulting
interconnection of multiple asynchronous AC areas. A conceptual
framework is outlined to address these challenges and ensure
the security of the combined AC/DC system. The need for
cooperation and exchange of information between the various
transmission system operators is highlighted in order to take
full advantage of the control flexibility of HVDC converters in
post-contingency situations.
Index Terms—Dynamic security assessment, mixed AC/DC
networks, multi-terminal direct current grids, post-contingency
corrective control
I. INTRODUCTION
The progress in High Voltage DC (HVDC) technology
and the possibility of extensions to Multi-Terminal Direct
Current (MTDC) configurations opens new perspectives but
raises new challenges in the operation of the resulting mixed
AC/DC grids [1]. Most works have addressed the secure
operation of such grids through Optimal Power Flows (OPF).
For example, in [2] the classical Security-Constrained OPF
(SCOPF) performed by the Transmission System Operator
(TSO) of an AC grid, is extended to a combined AC/DC grid.
The same spirit underlies the works in [3] and [4] presenting
mixed AC/DC SCOPF formulations including preventive and
corrective controls, while a hierarchical approach has been
proposed in [5].
In the above works, SCOPF is intended to be performed in a
centralized manner assuming that a single entity is responsible
for ensuring the security of the whole system. This is the
best option insofar as the MTDC grid is embedded in one
AC system operated by one TSO. However, future MTDC
grids are expected to interconnect multiple synchronous and
asynchronous areas. Solving the combined SCOPF centrally
will raise serious computational burden and model gathering
issues. Therefore, alternatives should be investigated so that
the computational burden is not increased prohibitively, the
information exchange is minimal and the autonomy of each
TSO is preserved.
To address those issues, a distributed OPF formulation was
proposed in [6]. The area of responsibility of each TSO
was extended to include the MTDC grid components directly
connected to it. Iterations with information exchanges between
TSOs are required to reach a common solution.
The most salient feature of Voltage Source Converters
(VSCs) is their ability to quickly modify the power flows
through the MTDC grid to which they are connected. They
allow MTDC grids to contribute to security through corrective
control applied after the occurrence of a disturbance.
Since an MTDC grid will require significant investments by
the TSOs of the adjacent AC grids, those TSOs will expect
to benefit from that infrastructure for security control. The
MTDC grid will be operated as a “common asset” to which all
adjacent TSOs have access to obtain support. As a counterpart,
conflicts are expected to arise when multiple TSOs will be
willing to act at the same time on the MTDC grid, or when
the action of one TSO will come to the expense of insecure
operation of another AC grid. To the authors’ knowledge, those
aspects have not been addressed in the literature.
This paper outlines a general framework to integrate MTDC
grids into existing tools for Dynamic Security Assessment
(DSA). Emphasis is put on using the MTDC grid for post-
contingency corrective control and resolving the possibly
resulting conflicts between the different TSOs connected to
it. For instance, MTDC grids planned to be integrated in the
European interconnection would be such cases. For simplicity,
the focus is on an MTDC grid interconnecting asynchronous
AC systems, each operated by a single TSO. It is common
for a synchronous AC grid to be operated by several TSOs,
acting in different areas, but the DSA of such AC multi-area
systems has already been addressed in the literature (e.g. [7])
and is not considered here.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines DSA
in highly general terms. Section III discusses the challenges
raised by the integration of MTDC grids. The general fra-
mework for DSA of combined AC/DC systems is outlined in
Section IV. A method to check if such a system is correctively
secure is described in Section V, while illustrative examples
are given in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. CHECKING WHETHER AN ALL-AC SYSTEM IS
CORRECTIVELY SECURE
In this section, DSA is formalized in the context of all-
AC grids. It will be extended to AC/DC configurations in
later sections. It is assumed that each TSO has the task of
assessing the security of its own grid, which entails simulating
the system response to each contingency of a list of credible
contingencies. In case the system response is not acceptable,
preventive and/or corrective actions are identified. Since the
focus is on corrective control, preventive actions are not
considered here. Instead, the focus is on simply identifying
whether there exists (at least) one acceptable post-contingency
control to correct the system response. In fact, any post-
contingency corrective action will be considered acceptable
provided it does not entail shedding load (above a small pre-
defined threshold).
This can be formalized as searching for a solution to the


















L(t) ≥ h(x(t),y(t),∆u,∆uls) (4)
∆u
ls ≥ ∆uls ≥ ∆uls (5)
∆u ≥ ∆u ≥ ∆u (6)
where x and y denote the time-varying differential and alge-
braic system states, satisfying the initial conditions x(0) = x0
and y(0) = y0, respectively. ∆u corresponds to the post-
disturbance corrective actions. W is a diagonal positive-
definite matrix that assigns a weight to each control action.
The term ∆uls corresponds to load shedding actions, with
weighting factors specified in Wls.
The objective (1) is the minimization of the total control
effort over a time interval T . Apart from setting the diagonal
terms of Wls much larger than those of W , no specific
weight tuning is assumed since the objective is not to find
the “cheapest” solution but to identify if there is at least one
acceptable. Nevertheless, different objective functions could
be also envisaged. The equality constraints (2) and (3) take
into account the dynamic response of the system to the initial
contingency and to the corrective actions. Constraints (4) ens-
ure that this system evolution satisfies specific limits, gathered
in the time-varying vector L(t) and guaranteeing at least a
stable transition towards the new operating point. Constraints
(5) and (6) avoid unrealistic control adjustments, by specifying
the upper and lower bounds ∆u
ls
, ∆uls and ∆u, ∆u.
If the solution of the above optimization problem is such
that ||∆uls|| is negligible, the system is declared correctively
secure for the contingency of concern.
III. SOME ISSUES OF DSA IN MIXED AC/MTDC SYSTEMS
Consider the generic system of Fig. 1 consisting of M
asynchronous AC areas connected to an MTDC grid through
N VSCs (or terminals). An area may be connected through
more than one VSC, i.e. N ≥M .
Clearly, in order to encompass the MTDC grid, modifica-
tions of the traditional all-AC framework have to be made.














Fig. 1. Generic system of AC areas connected to an MTDC grid
A. Contingencies and remedial actions
As regards contingencies that take place inside an AC area,
it makes sense to have them assessed by the TSO of concern.
Related modeling issues are discussed in Section III-B.
The probability of two independent contingencies taking
place at the same time in two different AC areas can be
considered negligible. Hence, for post-contingency corrective
control, it is reasonable to assume that, following an AC
contingency, only one TSO would request corrective actions
involving the MTDC grid.
On the other hand, the MTDC grid makes up an additional
infrastructure exposed to disturbances. The latter include the
outage of: (i) a VSC, (ii) a DC branch, or (iii) a part of the
HVDC grid for a short period of time.
Since the MTDC grid is expected to carry large powers over
long distances, a disturbance affecting one of its components
can have significant impacts on the connected AC areas.
Unlike AC contingencies, a DC contingency may lead to a
situation where more than one TSO requests support from the
MTDC grid. These actions may be conflicting, and a way to
resolve (or avoid) those conflicts should be contemplated.
This emphasizes the need for a coordinating entity that
can access the models and data of the AC areas in order to
assess the impact of DC contingencies beyond the limits of
the MTDC grid and take care of conflicts between TSOs.
B. Modeling requirements for AC contingency assessment
Let us come back to the assessment of AC contingencies.
For the security assessment of an all-AC system, the choice
of an appropriate boundary in the network representation is
important. The main idea is to keep enough detail so that the
response of the system model is not significantly modified
when replacing what is beyond the boundary by a much
simpler model. In all-AC systems it is common to include
a “buffer zone”, i.e. include in the model branches, loads and
generators of the external network which are significantly im-
pacted by contingencies occurring inside the study system. Too
small a buffer zone could lead to losing important information,
whereas a widespread zone would increase the computational
burden prohibitively.
Which buffer zone should be considered by a AC TSO
connected to its neighbors through an MTDC grid only?
A unique feature of HVDC connections between asynchro-
nous AC areas is that they can act as “firewalls” preventing the
effects of a contingency in one AC area from being propagated










































Fig. 2. Modeling options; shaded parts are preserved and included in the
model used for DSA by Area 1
operates with constant power flows. In this case, for a given
TSO, the model can include its own area and the VSCs directly
connected to it, as sketched in Fig. 2.A for the TSO of Area 1.
However, the power flows in the MTDC grid vary owing
to changes of VSC power set-points used as post-contingency
corrective controls by the AC TSO. They can also change
owing to the outage of a VSC, caused by an AC contingency.
To deal with such cases, it becomes essential for each TSO
to model the complete MTDC grid in addition to its own AC
grid, as sketched in Fig. 2.B. In other words, the MTDC grid
plays the role of a buffer zone retained in the model.
The size of the future MTDC grids is not expected to be
large. Thus, the increase in computational burden of including
a detailed model of the whole MTDC grid can be considered
negligible. At the same time, this model extension will make
it easier to account for local and/or centralized controls of the
VSCs, such as those considered in [8].
In principle the buffer zone could be further extended to
include parts of the AC grids of the other TSOs, as sketched
in Fig. 2.C. Yet, there is not enough evidence of a real benefit
associated to this model extension. The option of Fig. 2.B is
thus considered in the rest of this paper.
C. Representation of external AC systems
Once the boundary has been selected, the simplified repre-
sentation of the outside systems is important to account for
their impact on the response of the study system, and ensure
that the effects of a disturbance do not propagate into those
external systems.
There is an abundant literature dealing with the identifi-
cation of external equivalents in all-AC systems (e.g. [9],
[10] and their references). In the case of asynchronous AC
systems coupled through an MTDC grid, it seems sufficient
to account for the MTDC grid controls that alter the power
transfers between AC areas. Hence, in a first approximation,
the dynamics of the external AC systems could be neglected
and each VSC could be connected on its AC side to a Thévenin




















Fig. 3. Representation of external AC systems as Thévenin equivalents
IV. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR DSA OF A MIXED
AC/MTDC SYSTEM
Based on the above considerations, we outline a general
framework for DSA of a mixed AC/DC system. As shown
in Fig. 4, it involves the various AC TSOs as well as a
coordinating entity, referred to as “DC TSO”.
It is implicitly assumed that all TSOs are willing to coope-
rate, exchange information, and do their best efforts to ensure































Fig. 4. Framework for security assessment of AC/DC system
The DC TSO exchanges information with all connected AC
TSOs to coordinate them and resolve conflicts. Its role bears
similarity with that of a regional security coordinator, such as
CORESO [11], for instance. The concept of independent DC
grid operator has been advocated also in [12].
The DC TSO has a model of the whole AC/DC system,
and it performs DSA of the complete system, but with respect
to contingencies in the MTDC grid only. Although the model
used would be large, the number of DC contingencies to be
investigated would be small. This allows to perform DSA
with a full view of the system without prohibitive increase in
computational burden. If the system is insecure with respect
to a DC contingency, it is checked if it is correctively secure
by acting on the whole system (in particular the MTDC grid).
Each AC TSO uses a model of its AC system together with
the MTDC grid to perform DSA with respect to contingencies
in its own system. If the latter is insecure with respect to an
AC contingency, the TSO checks whether it is correctively
secure by acting on its system as well as the MTDC grid.
Resorting to corrective control in one AC area may cause
trouble to the other AC areas. To anticipate and hopefully
avoid such situations, it is proposed to incorporate in the
corrective control determination upper and lower limits on the
deviation of the various VSC powers with respect to their pre-
contingency values. It is assumed that violating such a VSC
limit would result in unacceptable behavior in the AC area to
which the VSC is connected.
Each TSO should receive those limits on all VSCs, and
determine the corrective actions while obeying those limits.
Grid codes could oblige the AC TSOs to provide and update
the values of these limits frequently.
While the determination of such limits is rather straightfor-
ward when an AC area is connected to the MTDC grid through
a single VSC, it is less obvious when more VSCs are involved
(e.g. Area M in Fig. 3).
V. CHECKING WHETHER A MIXED AC/MTDC SYSTEM IS
CORRECTIVELY SECURE
The formulation of Section II is now revisited to account
for the various areas and TSOs.
A. AC contingencies
For the i-th TSO (i = 1, . . . ,M ), an optimization problem
similar to that of Eqs. (1)-(6) is considered, with the addition
of MTDC grid controls:
min
∆ui,∆vi,∆ulsi
||∆ui||2Wu + ||∆vi||2Wv + ||∆ulsi ||2Wls (7)











Li(t) ≥ hi(xi(t),yi(t),∆ui,∆vi,∆ulsi ) (10)
∆ui
ls ≥ ∆ulsi ≥ ∆uils (11)
∆ui ≥ ∆ui ≥ ∆ui (12)
∆vi ≥ ∆vi ≥ ∆vi (13)
Lvi ≥ hthi (∆vi) (14)
where ∆vi is a vector of VSC power set-point changes, also
involved in the functions fi, gi and hi. The diagonal entries of
Wv are the corresponding weighting factors. The time-varying
vector Li includes also the physical and operational bounds
of the MTDC grid. All other symbols and initial conditions
have been defined in Section II.
The MTDC grid is included in the model and ∆vi leads
to modifying the MTDC grid power flows. If the other AC
areas are simply replaced by Thévenin equivalents as in Fig. 3,
the resulting MTDC grid power flows are only limited by
the MTDC grid constraints and the VSC ratings, taken into
account in the upper and lower bounds ∆vi and ∆vi in (13).
The constraints (14) correspond to the limits on VSC
powers introduced in Section IV and aimed at preventing the
corrective actions taken in the i-th AC area to have detrimental
impacts in the other AC areas. Namely, Lvi is a vector of (lower
and upper) limits on the actions available to the i-th TSO, as
determined by the other AC TSOs.
B. DC contingencies
The assessment of MTDC grid contingencies is performed
by the DC TSO, using a model of the whole AC/DC system.
Corrective actions can be identified by solving the following
optimization problem, which minimizes the total control effort
over all AC areas and the MTDC grid:
min
∆u,∆v,∆uls
||∆u||2Wu + ||∆v||2Wv + ||∆uls||2Wls (15)











Li(t) ≥ hi(xi(t),yi(t),∆ui,∆v,∆ulsi ) (18)
∆ui
ls ≥ ∆ulsi ≥ ∆uils (19)
∆ui ≥ ∆ui ≥ ∆ui (20)
∆v ≥ ∆v ≥ ∆v (21)
where ∆u = [∆u1 . . . ∆uM ] and ∆uls =[




. All other symbols and the initial
conditions have been defined in Section II. The above
procedure results in a single set of MTDC actions ∆v as
well as suggested AC actions ∆ui for each AC area.
In case an AC TSO does not agree with the proposed
control change in its area, it should provide properly updated
constraints back to the DC TSO. The latter should perform a
new DSA taking into account the updated constraints.
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
The following simulation results illustrate a few aspects
presented in the previous sections. Time-domain simulations
typical of DSA have been used to assess the dynamic response
to contingencies and corrective actions.
A. Test system
A simplified diagram of the test system is shown in Fig. 5. It
consists of two asynchronous AC areas and one offshore wind
farm, connected through a five-terminal MTDC grid. Each AC
area is based on the Nordic test system, set up by an IEEE
Task Force and documented in [13]. The two areas are referred
to as “East” and “West”, respectively. Each of them has two
points of connection to the MTDC grid. They are shown in
Fig. 6 for the East area.
Each VSC is modeled with 28 differential-algebraic equati-
ons involving the phase reactor, the phase locked loop, inner
and outer control loops, etc.
T3 and T4 control the power balance in the MTDC grid
based on the DC voltage droop control [14]. The rest of the
VSCs inject constant power into the MTDC grid. The initial
power in each VSC is shown in Fig. 5.
If the MTDC grid is not used for corrective control, both
East and West systems operate at an insecure point (operating
point A in [13]) with several contingencies leading to long-
term voltage instability. Namely, these involve the outage of
a transmission line in the North-Central corridor, the outage
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Fig. 6. East test system with connections to MTDC grid
Fig. 6). The load increase could stem from a change of the
power of T3 in the West or T4 in the East system.
B. Example of AC contingency
1) Full system response without corrective actions: The
first scenario involves the outage of line 4021-4042 in the
East system. Long-term voltage instability results. Voltages
in the East system drop progressively under the effect of
load tap changers and over-excitation limiters, ending up in
system collapse. Figure 7 shows the evolution of the voltage
at representative buses in the Central regions of East and West
systems, respectively. It is evident, that while the East system
is experiencing voltage instability, the impact on the West
system is negligible.
2) Using an equivalent of West system: DSA with respect
to this contingency falls under the responsibility of the East
TSO. The latter should use a model of its own system, together
with the MTDC grid and an equivalent representation of the
West system. While the previous simulation (yielding the curve







 0  50  100  150  200 t (s)
V (pu)
Voltage in East - detailed WestVoltage in East - equiv. WestVoltage in West - detailed West
Fig. 7. AC contingency: voltages in the Central regions of both systems
any simplification, the simulation is repeated with the West
system replaced by two Thévenin equivalents, in accordance
with Fig. 3. Those equivalents are attached on the AC sides
of T1 and T3, respectively.
Figure 7 shows (with dashed black curve) the evolution of
the same East bus voltage. No difference is observed compared
to the case with detailed representation of the West area,
confirming that such a simplified presentation is acceptable
for security assessment.
3) Constraints of West system: The constraints (14) relative
to the West system should be determined and communicated
in advance by its TSO. An example of determination of such
limits is provided in Fig. 8. It shows that drawing more than
100 MW from T3 leads to unacceptable, or even unstable
voltage response of the West system. As a result, the West
TSO will announce that no more than 100 MW can be obtained
from T3 for corrective control purposes.
4) Determination of corrective control actions: Next, the
East TSO checks the existence of corrective actions able to
stabilize its system, while respecting the constraints set by the
West TSO. In fact, in this case, it is possible to redirect some
power from T2 to T4, i.e. without asking the support of the
West system. By redirecting 300 MW, stability can be restored,
as shown in Fig. 9. The gradual ramping of powers of T2 and
T4 is shown in Fig. 10. The constraint of T3 is respected,
since the impact on the powers of T1 and T3 is negligible.
Hence, the East system is correctively secure with respect to
that contingency.
C. Example of DC contingency
The second case involves the tripping of VSC T2, which
initially injects 600 MW into the MTDC grid (see Fig. 5).
The contingency is applied at t = 5 s. As shown in Fig. 11,
the DC voltage droop controllers of T3 and T4 quickly respond
to that outage by adjusting their powers, thereby restoring the
MTDC power balance.
As a result, additional power is drawn from T3 and T4. This
power has to flow through the North-Central AC corridors of
the East and West systems, respectively. This leads to long-
term voltage instability in both systems, as shown in Fig. 12.
The corrective actions in this case are calculated by the DC
TSO. The East system needs support from West, while the
power drawn from the Central region of the latter (through T3)
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Fig. 8. AC contingency: voltage at a representative
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Fig. 9. AC contingency: voltage at a representative
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Fig. 12. DC contingency: voltages in Central
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Fig. 13. DC contingency: voltages in Central
regions of both AC systems with corrective control
of increasing the power injected by both T3 and T4, while
drawing that power from T1. Specifically, the power setpoint
of T1 is increased from 316 to 816 MW (similar to T2 in
Fig. 10), and this power change is equally shared between T3
and T4. This is sufficient to restore stable operation in both
systems, as observed by the voltage evolutions in Fig. 13.
Hence, the whole system is correctively secure with respect
to that contingency.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a conceptual framework for DSA
of a mixed system including asynchronous AC areas connected
through an MTDC grid. Advantage must be taken of the
control flexibility of VSCs in post-disturbance situations.
However, conflicts between AC TSOs are possible. To ad-
dress them, the proposed framework resorts to a coordinating
entity, referred to as DC TSO, that has full view of the system
and exchanges information with the AC TSOs.
A contingency in an AC grid is assessed by the TSO of
concern, including the MTDC grid in its system model. The
MTDC grid is used for corrective actions, while obeying limits
on VSC power changes announced by the other AC TSOs.
A contingency in the MTDC grid is assessed by the DC
TSO which suggests corrective actions throughout the whole
system. Further iterations may be required in case they are not
accepted by the AC TSOs.
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